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The thesis consists of fourtheoreticalarticles that can be readindependentlyof each
other on the common topic - strategic incentives in the management of natural re-
sources. Article I concerns biodiversity conservation of essential species in sustain-
ing the ecosystem. The issue is what forces that may explain why a natural resource
stock declines although the government is running a conservation programme in a
second-best solution. The focus is on the government's strategic behavior against
the industry being a polluter. Ten forces are identied that explains why a resource
may decline under a conservation programme. One result is that an increase in the
variance of the natural growth process does not lead to an increase in investment
in the emission-generating industry in the second-best solution, as in the rst-best
solution. In article II, a marine natural resource stock is exposed to harvest as well
as damage by pollutionfrom N countries. Each countryhas fourdecision variables:
harvesteffort,domesticproduction(generatingtransboundarypollution),abatement
and research in environmental technology. It is shown that the marine resource is
damaged `twice' as a result of a `chain effect' in the strategic incentives among
the countries. A harvest function is introduced, which results in `tough' harvest
efforts, implying that agents' effort increases the smaller the expected stock size
as an extreme case of the `tragedy of the commons'. In article III, the classical
upstream-downstreamcase is analyzed under the assumptions of the Coase theorem
in a dynamic model. Different assignments of rights to determine the level of exter-
nality are compared to the case of no-cooperation. It is shown that the `efciency
proposition' does not necessarily hold. Specically, a bargaining outcome may not
be possible when downstream society has the right to determine the level of ex-
ternality in the dynamic model as it may violate individual rationality of upstream
society. In the fourth article - a technical note - it is shown in a that in most models
with privateprovisionofpublicgoods,thereexists a simplemechanismdetermining
the reaction functions of the players.
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ronmental problems, bioeconomics, stochastic differential game theory, Coase The-
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Articles IIV1 Introduction
The theme of this thesis is the analysis of strategic incentives when several eco-
nomic actors either have open access to a natural renewable resource for harvest
and/or may inuence the growth of an open access resource due to other private ac-
tivities. There are several examples of transboundary natural resources e.g. marine
resources, animal species habitats, water resources, and sheries where the benets
are shared by many regions or nations and where conicts of interests occur in the
decision of policies, such as harvesting, environmental policies, and rehabilitative
means. Severalpolicies integrateecosystem rehabilitationthroughmore sustainable
productions in agriculture, forestry, sheries and through sustainable management
of renewable resources. In a broader context, biodiversity and ecological relation-
ships are transboundary. Management of `local resources' such as rural water, land,
agriculture, forests, sanitation and energy in one country or region will often affect
sustainability also in neighbor countries or regions due to ecological relationships
as well as transboundarypollution that harms renewable resources. Thus, initiatives
in the eld of sustainable development management and biodiversity conservation
often need to be internationaland/or interregional. This makes the analyze of strate-
gic incentives and cooperation a central issue in sustainable development. Conse-
quently, there are growing problems faced by many countries and regions bordering
transboundary resources arising from lack of effective policies, instruments, and
mechanisms for managing resources. It may be issues concerning over-harvesting,
pollution, groundwater shared by regions, building dams for hydroelectric power.
The coexistence of stock externalities, uncertainty and several independent re-
gions or social planners suggests stochastic differential game theory as a tool to
analyze the decision-making problems. This approach is essentially a combination
of game theory and optimal control. The rst steps in the development of differ-
ential game theory were taken by Rufus Isaacs during 1951-1954 in four RAND
workingpapers.1 During1960s and 1970s several articles were written on the topic.
Lancaster (1973) was an early application of differential game theory on economic
growth theory. During the 1980s and 1990s, differential game applications began
to be used in natural resource economics e.g. Clemhout and Wan Jr (1985), Kaitala
(1989), Jorgensen and Sorger (1990), Yeung (1992), Kaitala (1993), Kaitala and
Pohjola (1995), Jorgensen and Yeung (1996) and Maler et al. (2003).
A drawbackof stochastic differentialgame theoryis the problem of nding ana-
lytical tractable solutions. The functional structures that yield analytically tractable
solutions are very limited beyond the linear-quadratic approach, i.e. a linear dy-
namic system and quadratic objective functions. It is well known that the closed-
loopconceptrequiresspecicstructuresofthefunctionstoyieldanalyticallytractable
solutions in the Isaacs-Bellman-Fleming equation such as the linear-quadratic ap-
proach e.g. Starr and Ho (1969), the linear state games or the logarithmic models
e.g. Reinganum (1981). A common approach as in e.g. Clemhout and Wan Jr
(1985) is to use square-root functions in the dynamic system as well as the objec-
tive functions. This may imply that the state variable cancels in the product of the
1Isaacs (1965)
9shadow price function and the dynamic system leaving a constant in the maximized
Isaacs-Bellman-Fleming equation. I was inspired by Yeung (1998) as I found that
this method easily could be generalized to include constant returns-to-scale Cobb-
Douglas functions in the dynamic system with the control variable and the stock
variable as arguments. Specically, in the simplest case, say that the objective func-
tion contains the term x(t) with x(t) as the stock variable, then the dynamic sys-
tem maycontaintheterms x1 (t) orx(t) as the shadowpricefunctioncontainsthe
term x 1(t). This concept may then be extended by introducing cross-products
between state variables and the control variablesin `proper'ways in the functionsto
generate `block recursive' maximized Isaacs-Bellman-Fleming equations with ana-
lytically tractable solutions. Since the functions of x can be transformed to linear
functions the models can often be transformed to linear state games or an exten-
sion of these games in the presence of cross products. The transformation to linear
state games is useful in stochastic differential game theory as the second derivative
term of the value function cancels in the Isaacs-Bellman-Fleming equation (Dock-
neret al., 2000). Variationsofthis approachareusedin this thesis inarticles I, IIand
III. There were relatively few papers that presentedmodels with explicitlyidentied
nonlinear feedback Nash equilibria that were not degenerate. However, in the last
decadetherehas beenanincreasingdiscoveryanduse ofthelatter. Moreover,in e.g.
Yeung(1998)anoverviewofpapersarepresentedandit is alsoshownthatsomedif-
ferential games such as Sorger's game of competitive dynamic advertising (Sorger,
1989), Clemhout and Wan Jr's game of dynamic property resources (Clemhout and
Wan Jr, 1985) or Reinganum's game of race in research and development (Rein-
ganum, 1982) belong to a class of games which has linear value functions. Even
though, differential game theory models have been developed, the textbook litera-
ture on differential game theory has been rather sparse. A classical book is Basar
and Olsder (1999), which also covers difference games, however it is not until re-
cently that other books have appeared, such as Petrosjan and Zenkevich (1996) and
Dockner et al. (2000). A more recent development is cooperative differential game
theory although there are some classical literature on the topic such as Leitmann
(1974), Haurie (1976), Petrosjan (1977) and Haurie et al. (1994). Recently, coop-
erative stochastic differential games with time consistent rules for distribution of
the gains from cooperation have been developed e.g. Petrosjan (1997), Yeung and
Petrosjan (2001), Yeung and Petrosjan (2004) and Yeung (2004).
The thesis contains four articles. Three of the articles use stochastic differential
game theory techniques to explore strategic incentives when uncertainty is present.
The rst and second article, use non-cooperativestochastic differential game theory
while the third article uses techniques from stochastic cooperative differential game
theory. Finally, the fourth article is a technical note on the determination of reac-
tion functions in static public good models though the results transform to dynamic
models.
102 Article I - A differential game on the manage-
ment of natural capital subject to emissions
from industry production
The topic of article I concerns biodiversity conservation of ecosystems that have
indirect-use values such as essential species in sustaining the ecosystem. The is-
sue is what forces may explain why a stochastic natural resource stock declines
when the government is running a conservation programme in a second-best solu-
tion. A model is developed where a government makes tax-nanced investments in
a downstream renewable resource stock that is damaged by upstream industry pol-
lution. The analysis focuses on the situation where the governmentand the industry
act independently of each other in a second-best solution, though it is the govern-
ment incentives that are of primary interest in the game-theoretic analysis. While
the industry only receives prot from industry production, the government receives
benet from industry production as well as the renewable resource stock that is to
be restored and conserved. Moreover, the government faces a budget constraint
implying that the investment must be nanced by taxing the industry.
The article introduces ve concepts. Firstly, the essential focus is on the re-
newable resource stock - not pollution per se normally occurring as damage in the
objective function. The issue is rather how pollution damages the renewable re-
source stock and how this fact conveys to the shadow prices and costs of the stocks
in the optimizationproblems. The damage of currentpollutionis modelledas future
damage on the natural resource stock. Technically, this is modelled by introducing
an endogenous decay rate of renewable capital determined by the ratio of current
emissions ow and current renewable resource stock size. The result is that the
smaller the current renewable resource stock is for a given current emissions ow,
the greater is the damage to the growth of renewable resource stock. This means
that the actual carrying capacity may differ (be lower) than the natural carrying
capacity without industry pollution. It therefore takes time for the resource stock
to recover from current emissions ow. However, the government may increase the
speedofrecoveringbyinvestmentsintherenewableresourcestocksuchas restoring
and arranging habitat, land, wetlands or food supply. Secondly, the natural growth
function is a concave function which introduces an elasticity measure " 2 (0;1) of
growth representing how `resistant' the resource stock is to reductions in its own
stock level. The greater is " the less will natural growth fall as the current stock
size falls. If  = 0 the growth function is a linear function with positive slope. If
" = 1 the growth function is a linear function with negative slope and a positive
intercept with the vertical _ kN axis, implying that the natural growth rate cannot
go down to zero. For all values 0 < " < 1 the natural growth function exhibit a
smooth concave function of the logistic growth function type. The benets of the
introduction of this growth elasticity measure in the natural growth function is that
it can generate a wider range of natural growth rate patterns that apply to differ-
ent species. Moreover, the functional form can be transformed to t the limited
structures that are known to generate analytical tractable solutions in dynamic pro-
gramming solutions. Thirdly, the smaller the natural resource stock size, the greater
amount of investment is needed to increase growth by a given amount. Technically,
11the investmentin the natural resource stock is dened by a constant-returns-to-scale
Cobb-Douglas function with investment and stock as arguments. The smaller the
resistance  of the resource stock, the less effective is a given amount of invest-
ment. Fourthly, the damage from emissions ow is determined by an endogenous
decay rate function, determined by the ratio between emissions ow over the re-
source stock size, suggesting that a given emissions ow generates a greater decay
rate if the current stock size is small. However, a great resistance  of the resource
stock counteracts this effect. Fifthly, a common approach in the literature using dif-
ferential game theory is to use square-root functions in objective functions and the
dynamic system. In this article, I solve the model without specifying the functions
completelyand therebymake explicit the type of inherent structurethat results from
this kind of technical restrictions in the literature. From an economic viewpoint, the
technical restriction is here plausible as it implies that the social planner derives a
greater utility from a natural capital stock that is `more resistant' to emissions, i.e.
the growth of natural capital falls less from a given reduction in stock size due to
damage from emissions ow.
Comparativestaticsaroundthesecond-bestsolutionshowstenForces,orcaveats,
that may explain why a stochastic natural resource stock declines even though the
governmentis runninga conservationprogrammein the second-bestsolution. Some
caveats are an industry sector with long-term preferences, a low depreciation rate of
physical capital beyond uncertainty in the natural capital stock. Moreover, in the
second-best solution, the industry's investment path is independent upon the vari-
ance of the stochastic process. However, this was not case in the rst-best solution
when the government is in charge of industry investments; the greater the variance
of natural resource's growth process the greater is the government's investment in
the emission-generating industry. Hence, even though the second-best solution im-
plies greater investments in the emission-generating industry per se, it hampers the
government's increase of investments in the emission-generating industry resulting
from an increase in uncertainty of the natural resource stock.
3 Article II - An international marine pollutant
sink in an asymmetric environmental technol-
ogy game
Heretofore, the issues of harvest and pollution have usually been treated separately
in different models. An overview of the models on e.g. shery is found in Bjorn-
dal et al. (2000). In the 1990s, differential game theory has also been introduced
in international environmental issues. Often these models are based on national
consumption or production, which generate transboundary pollution, for example
de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg (1991), Kaitala et al. (1992), Tahvonen (1994), Haurie
and Zaccour (1995), Maler and de Zeeuw (1998), Jorgensen and Zaccour (2001b),
Jorgensen and Zaccour (2001a). This article allows for harvest and pollution to ap-
pear together in a model with N countries. Several marine resources are subject
to transboundary pollution (e.g. being used as pollutant sinks) as well as harvest,
such as the Baltic sea, where biomass is harvested at the same time as there is over-
12fertilization from agriculture. The stock of biomass is then affected by both these
measures. It could be argued that the damage from using a renewable resource as a
pollutant sink could be seen as another kind of `harvest', however, there is one im-
portant difference - harvest is a ow that can be changed quickly while pollution is
often a stock, which takes time to change. Thus, the damage effect from harvest on
renewablecapital should thereforebe of differentcharactercomparedto the damage
effect of pollution. Rehabilitative means after a damage from pollution requires the
reduction of a pollution stock not just the reduction of harvest ows. Not only is
pollution long-lived per se but also the damage to the resource stock.
Technically, the article brings together ideas from several areas: IO theory and
the approach of `tough' strategies from Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), extended to
international environmental problems in Copeland and Taylor (1990); differential
game models on international pollution such as Kaitala et al. (1992), Tahvonen
(1994), de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg (1991) and de Zeeuw and Maler (1998); bioe-
conomics with open access e.g. Clemhout and Wan Jr (1985), Kaitala (1993), Jor-
gensen and Yeung (1996) and de Zeeuw and Maler (1998) and endogenous hori-
zontal innovation growth models from growth theory e.g. Romer (1990) and Jones
(1995). The game is solved by using the Isaacs-Bellman-Fleming dynamic pro-
gramming technique, identifying the subgame perfect Nash controls of investment
rates, harvest efforts, abatements and environmental research efforts for N coun-
tries. The solution is then compared to the social optimum solution solved with
stochastic optimal control theory.
The features introduced in the model are as follows. Firstly, each country has
fourdecisionvariables,harvesteffort,investmentrateindomesticindustry(generat-
ing emissions), abatement, and nally, environmental research efforts that improve
the abatement measures. Secondly, a harvest function is introduced where the dam-
age of the N countries' harvest efforts are measured as a decay rate with a damage
parameter. The point is that harvest activities, beyond the caught individuals, may
cause further damage of different degrees to habitats and disturbing reproduction
and this degree is reected by the damage parameter. Thirdly,the damage from pol-
lution is measured as a concentration rate between the current pollution stock and
natural resource stock. The greater the pollution stock is over the natural resource
stock the greater is the current decay rate and the greater is the future loss of natural
resourcestock. Beyondthis, thereis alsoatoxicityparameterreectingdifferentde-
grees of toxicity of the pollution. Fourthly,the paper introducesendogenousgrowth
that are asymmetrical across the N countries. The research sectors and the accumu-
lation of environmental knowledge follow a simple accumulation process similar
to the Romer (1990) growth model with the same result that the research effort (in
each country) is constant over time. There is also a cost of doing research that may
differ between the countries. Fifthly, the paper introduces a pollution stock with
a sum of N Cobb-Douglas functions determining the total growth of the pollution
stock in the sea. The arguments are pollution ow by each country and the present
pollution stock size. The growth of pollution is decreasing by the degree of toxicity.
The latter could be discussed, as it is rather a result of technical convenienceto keep
the solution analytically tractable. Sixthly, the total abatement effort is determined
by a sum of N Cobb-Douglas abatement functions. The natural growth function,
13the domestic production sectors and the physical capital accumulations are adopted
from article I.
A major result of the harvest function is `tough' or `aggressive' harvest efforts.
In many dynamic models on renewable resources, harvest efforts decrease as the
stock size decreases. In this model, the agents' effort increases the smaller the ex-
pected stock size as an extreme case of the `tragedy of the commons'. Such harsh
competition about what is left of a valuable resource has been seen for commons in
the developing world, e.g. the Lake Manzala in Egypt where poor shermen des-
perately increase efforts by shing during spawning/breeding seasons, using illegal
ne mesh nets and even dynamite or poisons in the competition for a declining food
resource. In the model, it is seen that the aggressive harvest effort signals a credi-
ble threat by one agent to other agents: If any other agent increases harvest effort,
emissions or reduces abatement effort (and thereby reduces the expected stock of
renewable resource), the agent in question will also speed up harvest effort as a
credible threat to protect its claims on what is left to harvest of the resource. This
rational reasoning holds for every agent. Due to strategic incentives in the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium,the resource stock is exploited and damagedtwice, rstly,
by increased emissions, and then secondly, by increased harvest efforts. Each agent
harvests the resource earlier in time in order to get as much of the resource before
the concentration rate (pollution stock per unit of renewable resource stock) grows
and increases the depreciation of the resource.
There are two alternatives for an agent to reduce the world's pollution stock,
by abatement or by exploiting the transboundary renewable resource as a pollutant
sink (assimilation). The former alternative incurs two private costs to the agent,
a cost for abatement effort and a cost for environmental research effort. On the
contrary, the latter alternative incurs a sunk cost of forgone future resource for all
agents as pollution decreases current reproduction capacity. In the Nash equilib-
rium, each agent performs less abatement and less environmental research effort,
therefore shifting over the burden of pollution to all the other agents by using the
transboundary renewable resource as a pollutant sink rather than investing in envi-
ronmental technology compared to the social optimum. As a result, the concentra-
tion of pollution absorbed by the renewable resource stock grows at a higher rate
in the subgame prefect Nash equilibrium, which creates further incentives to each
country to speed up harvest effort as the efciency of harvest effort falls with the
increase in concentration of pollution. The strategic incentives in abatement, har-
vest efforts and investments in emission-generatingindustry as well as environment
research, all originate from the same source - the externality connected to the open
access of the marine resource. Another result, which is expected, is that volatility in
the renewable resource stock slows down agents' environmental technology growth
in the Nash equilibrium. Every agent prefers to harvest the resource too much and
too early in time as the concentration of pollution stock per unit of resource stock
rises faster and damages the stock earlier in time. The greater the volatility, the
greater is the incentive for the agent to shift over the burden of pollution to the other
agents by using the resource as a pollutant sink rather than investing in domestic
environmental technologies that improve domestic abatement efforts.
144 Article III-The Coase theoremina stochastic
growth model
This article illustrates the Coase theorem in a dynamic model with stock dynam-
ics. The essential difference, comparedto the static models that have been launched
hitherto, is that the initial Coasean bargainingnot only concerns an externality level
with a corresponding lump sum reallocation, but rather a `plan' of Pareto optimal
controls and a liability payment ow to the agent that has the right to determine the
externality level. The latter ow is, technically, a side payment ow to `bribe' the
agent having the legal rights to reduce the externality level. This implies that one
may look at techniques used in cooperative differential game theory e.g. Petrosjan
and Zenkevich (1996), Petrosjan (1997) and Filar and Petrosjan (2000). There is
also a literature on (time consistent) side payments in upstream-downstream e.g.
(Jorgensen and Zaccour, 2001b) and Haurie and Zaccour (1995). Recently, a liter-
ature has emerged on the issue of nding payoff distributions between participants
in cooperative stochastic differential games, e.g. Yeung and Petrosjan (2004) and
Yeung (2004).
The article does not deal with aspects of imperfections within the Coase bar-
gaining process but will assume that the bargaining process takes place with no
transaction costs and result in a Pareto optimal bargaining outcome. The contribu-
tion of this paper is rather that it illustrates the Coase theorem in a dynamic model
with upstream and downstream stock dynamics. A very simple model, which is
a transformation of a linear state game, is used for illustration. However, the dy-
namic programming is used to nd the solution just as in the two other articles. A
phase portrait of the Coasean vector eld illustrates the results. The assignment of
propertyrights will not affect the Coasean steady state and the surroundingCoasean
vector eld. The agent that has the right to determine the externality level has the
advantage to choose initial conditions in the Coasean dynamic system. i.e. whether
the process starts in upstream society's or downstream society's private equilibrium
steady state. It is found that the corresponding liability payment ow is propor-
tional to the production volume of upstream society. The Coasean bargaining so-
lution policy then involves a move from any of these initial conditions towards the
Coasean steady state. The unique Pareto optimal transition paths connecting each
private equilibrium steady state and the Coasean steady state are identied. When
the contracting parties reach the Coasean steady state, the party that lacks the right
to determine the externality level has to continue paying a steady state liability ow
forever to the party that has the right to determine the externality level. The effect
of increased volatility in the stock enters the dynamic system in the same way as in-
creased time preferences or depreciation rates since uncertainty reduces the shadow
priceat givenstocklevels. Thegrowthin downstreamsociety is furtherdelayedbya
low downstream technology level and/or high downstream depreciation rate and/or
high volatility of downstream stock and a high pollution parameter. Even though
both societies will gain in the long-run, downstream society has to wait longer than
upstream society before it can collect the gains in terms of higher growth.
Another major result is that the efciency proposition that the initial assignment
of rights does not affect the Pareto optimal solution does not hold in this model.
15When downstream society has the right to be free from pollution, individual ra-
tionality (at each instance of time) is not satised for the upstream society. The
disagreement shadow price of upstream capital is too low as the upstream society
entersthe bargainingprocess. Thisresult probablystems fromthenaiverelationship
between emissions and production in the upstream society. The downstream soci-
ety would not allow any upstream emissions at all, and hence, upstream society are
forced to zero production and the disagreement shadow price of upstream society is
zero as bargaining commence.
5 Article IV- Responseaversion inpublicgoods
models
The slope of a player's reaction function reveals her willingness to `exchange' a
unit of own activity for a unit of other players' activity. In other words, the slope
of the reaction function reveals the player's `response aversion' to changes in other
players' activities. Article IV is a technical note that presents a mechanism, which
may mitigate analysis and improve understanding of subgame perfect behavior in
public good models with private provision. Specically, the mechanism shows how
a player may be response averse, response neutral or even a response lover depend-
ing on the relationship between her marginal benet and marginal cost functions.
By translating a player's strategic behavior to terms of her marginal benet and
marginal cost functions, the mechanism enlightens the way policy instruments, eco-
nomic instruments in agreements and institutions affect the strategic behavior of an
actor.
However, the mechanism only applies to public good models. The mechanism
may e.g. be appliedon publicgoodsin coalition theorywherethe slope of a player's
reaction function is a proxy for her incentives to free-ride on other players' increase
in activity levels beyond non-cooperative levels. Carraro and Marchiori (2002),
present a summary of the last decade of developments of theory of coalition stabil-
ity. They conclude that the slope of the reaction function is one of four major fea-
tures (the other being membership rules, order of moves, and players' conjectures)
that are conclusive for the stability of coalitions and agreements. The mechanism
derived in this note then enlightens the way policy instruments, the level of con-
gestible services, economic instruments stated in agreements and institutions that
punish free-riding will affect free-rider incentives in public good models.
6 Drawbacks and Further Research
The purpose with this section is to give some support to those who should view this
thesis from a critical standpoint. A second purpose is to bring forward suggestions
for further research. There are several simplications, restrictions and drawbacks in
the four articles and the author do not claim that these are all drawbacks or short-
comings of the articles. The supervisors and external reviewers gave professional
16support and the author is therefore solely responsible for all shortcomings in the
articles of this thesis.
6.1 Article I
A serious restriction, or drawback, of the rst article is that the industry has no
strategic response to changes in the governmenttax in the second-best solution, and
hence, the model, as it stands, cannot be used to analyze Pigovian taxes. However,
the purpose of the article is to focus on the government's strategic response to the
industry behavior when it is running the conservation programme of investing in
the natural resource stock. By making the model more complex and introducing
an industry response to a change in taxes, the effect of Pigovian taxes could have
been analyzed as well. This would most likely also change the result that there is
no change in investment in the emission-generating industry from an increase in
uncertainty in the second-best solution.
Another extension would be to use robust control to analyze possible precau-
tionary behavior of the government as the natural resource stock size become low
(Roseta-Palma and Xepapadeas, 2004).
6.2 Article II
A conclusive simplication in this model is the common parameters in the abate-
ment function, decay function and growth function of pollution. These restrictions
derive from the priority to nd analytically tractable solutions. In some cases, the
restrictions may be plausible; however, the appearance of the pollution toxicity in
the growth function of pollution is questionable. Unfortunately, I have no sugges-
tions for improvementsif we are lookingfor analytically tractable solutions and this
is, no doubt, a weakness of this part of the model.
An extension to this model would be to add research in a traditional sector
and let each country allocate resources between the two domestic resource sectors.
However, the technical problems may be extensive. Another extension would be
to solve the model (and the model in article I) for subgame consistent cooperative
solutions with time consistent payoff distributions between the actors. Technical
achievements in cooperativegame theory with stochastic processes have been made
recently in papers by Yeung and Petrosjan (2004). Their approach could likely be
used to nd analyticallytractablesolutionsto the modelswith a structure ofthe kind
in this paper.
6.3 Article III
Article III illustrates the Coase theorem in a very simple model, which is, as far as I
cansee, a transformationofalinearstate game. It wouldbeinterestingtoextendthis
model to a non-linear approach as well as abandon the naive relationship between
the upstream capital stock size and the upstream emissions such that upstream soci-
ety can hold a stock that is invested elsewhere without generating emissions as well
as engaging in environmental research changing the relationship between capital
17size and pollution ow. This would change the disagreement condition of upstream
society in a way that may make it possible to full the efciency proposition. Fur-
thermore, one could look for weaker individual rationality conditions rather than
the using the strongest condition (rationality satised at each instant of time). Until
then, the question remains, is it possible to reproduce the Coase theorem's `ef-
ciency proposition' in a dynamic model with stock dynamics?
6.4 Article IV
This note was sent to the previously mentioned journal and came back from the
associate editor saying that the paper makes a "technical point whose contribution
is difcult to understand". There is a request for adding an application as an illus-
tration or an explicit discussion that motivates what we learn from this technical
note.2 However, reviewers seem to agree that the mathematics is correct, though
two reviewers asked, "What is Young's theorem?" (answer: the cross-derivatives of
a function f are identical if f is twice continuously differentiable, see e.g. Chiang
(1984)). Anyway, the author is inclined to say that all we may learn from this tech-
nical note is already there in the note. The theorem just presents a mechanism that
holds in public goods models. That's it.
2Such an application could be to use the mechanism in the analysis of private provision in public
good models with coalition theory. Besides this, the mechanism can sometimes also be used to simplify
calculation of the reaction function.
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